1985年巴菲特致股东信

📜 一、1985年股东信背景与历史脉络

📊 1. 当年美股三大指数表现

🏆 2. 当年全市场表现 Top 5 行业与热门领涨股票（含真实涨跌幅）

• 表现最佳 Top 5 行业/板块及涨幅：食品与消费品 (+52%)、媒体与广播 (+45%)、零售业 (+38%)、金融服务 (+32%)、制药 (+28%)
• 表现最佳 Top 5 领涨股票及具体涨幅：Capital Cities/ABC (+98%)、Wal-Mart (+75%)、Philip Morris (+62%)、RJR Nabisco (+52%)、Merck (+45%)

3. 宏观与资本市场环境

美股大幅飙升，道指首次突破1500点；并购与杠杆收购（LBO）风潮风起云涌。

4. 伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司动态

历史性决定：正式永久关闭了伯克希尔创业百年的纺织业务；收购Scott Fetzer（斯科特费策）公司和Fechheimer Brothers；协助Capital Cities收购ABC（美国广播公司）。

5. 当年重大历史事件与新闻

《广场协议》（Plaza Accord）签署，美元大幅贬值；戈尔巴乔夫出任苏联最高领导人；微软发布Windows 1.0。

💡 二、1985年股东信核心要点与投资思想影响

1. 理性面对“沉没成本”与关停困境业务：即使感情上极度不舍，当纺织业务无法产生合理回报且没有改善希望时，关停是唯一理性选择。

2. 经典论述：“当一个以讲求实效著称的管理者去应对一个经济状况糟糕的商业实体时，维持原状的往往是后者的名声。”（When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.）

📄 三、1985年致股东信原文与中文对照

原文信息：

• 标题：1985 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
• 作者：Warren Buffett
• 发表时间：1986-03-04
• 链接：HTML
• 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
• 整理：Yoan
• 校译：Yoan

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：

You may remember the wildly upbeat message of last year’s report: nothing much was in the works but our experience had been that something big popped up occasionally.¹ This carefully-crafted corporate strategy paid off in 1985. Later sections of this report discuss (a) our purchase of a major position in Capital Cities/ABC, (b) our acquisition of Scott & Fetzer, (c) our entry into a large, extended term participation in the insurance business of Fireman’s Fund, and (d) our sale of our stock in General Foods.

各位可能还记得去年年报最后提到的那个非常乐观的消息：虽然平时表面上无所作为，但根据我们的经验，偶尔也会有一些大动作。这一精心制定的企业策略终于在 1985 年有了结果，本报告的后半部将会讨论到：(a) 入股 Capital Cities/ABC，(b) 并购 Scott & Fetzer，(c) 进入 Fireman's Fund 保险业务，(d) 卖出 General Foods。

Our gain in net worth during the year was $613.6 million, or 48.2%. It is fitting that the visit of Halley’s Comet coincided with this percentage gain: neither will be seen again in my lifetime. Our gain in per-share book value over the last twenty-one years (that is, since present management took over) has been from $19.46 to $1643.71, or 23.2% compounded annually, another percentage that will not be repeated.

去年伯克希尔的账面价值约增加了6.136亿美金，约增长了48.2%(标普31.6%)，这一比率就好比哈雷慧星造访一般，在我有生之年这两者都不会再见到了。自现任管理层接手的21年来，每股账面价值从19.46增加到1,643.71美元，年复合增长率约23.2%，这是另一项不可能再重现的比率。

Two factors make anything approaching this rate of gain unachievable in the future. One factor probably transitory - is a stock market that offers very little opportunity compared to the markets that prevailed throughout much of the 1964-1984 period. Today we cannot find significantly-undervalued equities to purchase for our insurance company portfolios. The current situation is 180 degrees removed from that existing about a decade ago, when the only question was which bargain to choose.

有两个因素使得这种比率在未来难以持续，一种因素属于暂时性：与过去20相比，如今的投资机会越来越少。我们很难找到价值低估的股票为保险业务构建投资组合，这种情况与十年前有180度的转变，当时惟一的问题是该挑选哪个便宜货，而现在是没有便宜货。

This change in the market also has negative implications for our present portfolio. In our 1974 annual report I could say: “We consider several of our major holdings to have great potential for significantly increased values in future years.” I can’t say that now. It’s true that our insurance companies currently hold major positions in companies with exceptional underlying economics and outstanding managements, just as they did in 1974.² But current market prices generously appraise these attributes, whereas they were ignored in 1974. Today’s valuations mean that our insurance companies have no chance for future portfolio gains on the scale of those achieved in the past.

市场的热情也对我们现有的投资组合产生不利的影响，在1974年的年报中，我可以说：我们认为我们的几个主要持股在未来几年具有显着增加价值的巨大潜力，但现在我们不能这么说了。虽然我们投资组合持有的公司像1974年一样拥有优秀经营团队和特许经营业务，但目前市场上的股价已充分反应这项特点，而1974年股价却被大大低估。现在的估值意味着，今后我们保险公司的投资绩效再也无法像过去那样优异。

The second negative factor, far more telling, is our size. Our equity capital is more than twenty times what it was only ten years ago. And an iron law of business is that growth eventually dampens exceptional economics. just look at the records of high-return companies once they have amassed even $1 billion of equity capital. None that I know of has managed subsequently, over a ten-year period, to keep on earning 20% or more on equity while reinvesting all or substantially all of its earnings. Instead, to sustain their high returns, such companies have needed to shed a lot of capital by way of either dividends or repurchases of stock. Their shareholders would have been far better off if all earnings could have been reinvested at the fat returns earned by these exceptional businesses. But the companies simply couldn’t turn up enough high-return opportunities to make that possible.

第二项负面因素更显而易见，也就是我们的规模。目前我们在股票投入的资金是十年前的20多倍，而市场的铁律是，规模增长终将拖累经济效率。看看那些高回报率的公司，一旦当他们的股本规模超过十亿美金，没有一家公司在往后的十年能够将其全部或大部分收益进行再投资的同时，维持20%以上的股权回报率。相反，为了维持高回报率，这些公司只能通过大量分红或回购来剥离资本。如果所有的收益都可以再投资于这些杰出企业来获得的丰厚回报，股东的情况则会好得多，但是根本无法找到足够的高回报机会来实现这一目标。

Their problem is our problem. Last year I told you that we needed profits of $3.9 billion over the ten years then coming up to earn 15% annually. The comparable figure for the ten years now ahead is $5.7 billion, a 48% increase that corresponds - as it must mathematically - to the growth in our capital base during 1985. (Here’s a little perspective: leaving aside oil companies, only about 15 U.S. businesses have managed to earn over $5.7 billion during the past ten years.)

而我们的问题就跟他们一样，去年我告诉各位在往后十年我们大约要赚到39亿美金，每年才能达到15%的收益率。今年由于账面价值增长了48%，同样的门槛提高到57亿美金。撇开石油公司，据统计只有15家公司在过去十年能够赚到57亿美金。

Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, and I are reasonably optimistic about Berkshire’s ability to earn returns superior to those earned by corporate America generally, and you will benefit from the company’s retention of all earnings as long as those returns are forthcoming. We have several things going for us: (1) we don’t have to worry about quarterly or annual figures but, instead, can focus on whatever actions will maximize long-term value; (2) we can expand the business into any areas that make sense - our scope is not circumscribed by history, structure, or concept; and (3) we love our work. All of these help. Even so, we will also need a full measure of good fortune to average our hoped-for 15% - far more good fortune than was required for our past 23.2%.

查理和我对于伯克希尔能够获得高于一般美国企业的获利能力持相当乐观的态度，而只要获利持续成长，股东就会从公司保留收益中受益。我们有几件事情要做：(1)我们不必去担心每季或每年的帐面获利数字，而是将注意力集中在最大化长期价值上，(2)我们可以将业务版图扩大到任何有利可图的产业之上，而完全不受经验、组织或观念所限，(3)我们喜爱我们的工作。这些都是关键因素，但即便如此我们仍需要充分的好运气(比过去达到23.2%还要更多)才有办法使我们的平均回报率维持15%。

We need to mention one further item in the investment equation that could affect recent purchasers of our stock. Historically, Berkshire shares have sold modestly below intrinsic business value. With the price there, purchasers could be certain (as long as they did not experience a widening of this discount) that their personal investment experience would at least equal the financial experience of the business. But recently the discount has disappeared, and occasionally a modest premium has prevailed.³

另外我要特别说一下投资恒等式「P=EPS*PE」的另一个项：市场估值，这与最近购买本公司股票的投资者密切相关。回望历史，伯克希尔的股价一直略低于内在价值。在这种情况下，只要折价的幅度不再继续扩大，投资者的投资收益会与公司的业绩表现趋于一致，但最近折价消失了，甚至有一些小幅溢价。

The elimination of the discount means that Berkshire’s market value increased even faster than business value (which, itself, grew at a pleasing pace). That was good news for any owner holding while that move took place, but it is bad news for the new or prospective owner. If the financial experience of new owners of Berkshire is merely to match the future financial experience of the company, any premium of market value over intrinsic business value that they pay must be maintained.⁴

折价消失意味着伯克希尔的市值增加幅度高于内在价值增长的速度，虽然后者的表现也不错。当然这对于此前便持有股份的人算是好消息，但对于新股东或潜在股东却是不利的，而后者若想获得与公司的表现一致的投资收益，那就需要这种估值溢价现象一直维持。

Management cannot determine market prices, although it can, by its disclosures and policies, encourage rational behavior by market participants. My own preference, as perhaps you’d guess, is for a market price that consistently approximates business value. Given that relationship, all owners prosper precisely as the business prospers during their period of ownership. Wild swings in market prices far above and below business value do not change the final gains for owners in aggregate; in the end, investor gains must equal business gains. But long periods of substantial undervaluation and/or overvaluation will cause the gains of the business to be inequitably distributed among various owners, with the investment result of any given owner largely depending upon how lucky, shrewd, or foolish he happens to be.⁵

然而管理层无法控制股价，尽管可以对外披露公司信息和政策，以促使市场参与者的行为理性一点。也许你已经猜到，我本人更倾向于市场价格始终接近内在价值，惟有这样，股东持有期间的回报才能跟公司业绩趋于一致。市场价格远高于或低于企业价值并不会改变股东的最终回报，归根结底，所有股东的回报必定与公司业绩保持一致。但是，股价长期偏离其内在价值(不管是高估或低估)会导致公司收益分配不公，股东的投资收益在很大程度上取决于其幸运、聪明或愚笨的程度。

Over the long term there has been a more consistent relationship between Berkshire’s market value and business value than has existed for any other publicly-traded equity with which I am familiar. This is a tribute to you. Because you have been rational, interested, and investment-oriented, the market price for Berkshire stock has almost always been sensible. This unusual result has been achieved by a shareholder group with unusual demographics: virtually all of our shareholders are individuals, not institutions. No other public company our size can claim the same.⁶

长期来看，伯克希尔的市值与内在价值一直保持着一种稳定的关系，在所有我熟悉的上市公司中，这都是很少见的。这要归功于所有伯克希尔的股东，因为你们的理性、专注、以投资为导向，伯克希尔的股价一直很合理，这不寻常的结果是由一群不寻常的股东实现的，实际上，我们的股东几乎都是个人而不是机构，没有一家规模相近的上市公司能够做到这一点。

You might think that institutions, with their large staffs of highly-paid and experienced investment professionals, would be a force for stability and reason in financial markets. They are not: stocks heavily owned and constantly monitored by institutions have often been among the most inappropriately valued.

或许你会认为机构拥有大量高薪与经验丰富的专业人士，将会成为金融市场稳定与理性的力量。但事实并非如此，机构大量持股且持续关注的股票，其价格通常是最不合理的。

Ben Graham told a story 40 years ago that illustrates why investment professionals behave as they do: An oil prospector, moving to his heavenly reward, was met by St. Peter with bad news. “You’re qualified for residence”, said St. Peter, “but, as you can see, the compound reserved for oil men is packed. There’s no way to squeeze you in.” After thinking a moment, the prospector asked if he might say just four words to the present occupants. That seemed harmless to St. Peter, so the prospector cupped his hands and yelled, “Oil discovered in hell.” Immediately the gate to the compound opened and all of the oil men marched out to head for the nether regions. Impressed, St. Peter invited the prospector to move in and make himself comfortable. The prospector paused. “No,” he said, “I think I’ll go along with the rest of the boys. There might be some truth to that rumor after all.”

格雷厄姆40年前曾讲过一个故事，说明了专业人士为何会如此行事：一个石油商人在天堂的门口见到圣彼得，圣彼得带给他一个好消息跟一个坏消息，好消息是他确实有资格进入天堂，但坏消息专供石油商人居住的屋子已经没有位置了。石油商人想了一下，问圣彼得他能不能跟现有住户讲几句话，圣彼得觉得没什么大碍就答应了，石油商人捧着手对屋里大喊："地狱里发现石油了"，随即屋门打开，所有的石油商人争先恐后地往地狱奔去，圣彼得随即邀请石油商人搬进来，但石油商人顿了一下后说到："不！我还是跟他们一起去比较妥当，空穴来风，必有其因。"

Sources of Reported Earnings 报告收益的来源

The table on the next page shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. These numbers, along with far more detailed sub-segment numbers, are the ones that Charlie and I focus upon. We do not find consolidated figures an aid in either managing or evaluating Berkshire and, in fact, never prepare them for internal use. ⁷

下表展示伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源，这些数字以及更详细的细分业务信息是查理跟我关注的重点，我们不认为合并的总数对管理或评估伯克希尔有什么帮助，实际上我们内部也从不会用到。

Segment information is equally essential for investors wanting to know what is going on in a multi-line business. Corporate managers always have insisted upon such information before making acquisition decisions but, until a few years ago, seldom made it available to investors faced with acquisition and disposition decisions of their own. Instead, when owners wishing to understand the economic realities of their business asked for data, managers usually gave them a we-can’t-tell-you-what-is-going-on-because-it-would-hurt-the-company answer. Ultimately the SEC ordered disclosure of segment data and management began supplying real answers. The change in their behavior recalls an insight of Al Capone: “You can get much further with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone.”

细分业务信息对于想要了解一家多元化公司发展情况的投资者来说同等重要，公司管理层在并购一家公司时通常也是基于这些信息作出决策，但最近这几年，他们很少将这些信息提供给决定买进卖出股权的投资者，相反当股东想要了解公司的经营情况要求管理层提供数据时，他们通常以危害公司利益为由拒绝提供，直到最后证监会下令公司须披露细分业务数据，管理层才报告出来，这种态度的转变让我想起Al Capone的一个比喻：拿着一支枪好好的说比光是好好的说，效果要好上很多。

In the table, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 annual report, is aggregated as a separate item. (A compendium of the 1977-1984 letters is available upon request.) In the Business Segment Data and Management’s Discussion sections on pages 39-41 and 49-55, much additional information regarding our businesses is provided, including Goodwill and Goodwill Amortization figures for each of the segments. I urge you to read those sections as well as Charlie Munger’s letter to Wesco shareholders, which starts on page 56.⁸

在该表中，商誉的摊销没有记入具体的业务，而是出于 1983 年年度报告中我的信的附录中所述的原因，作为一个单独的项目汇总在一起。（1977-1984 年信件汇编可应要求提供。）在第 39-41 页和第 49-55 页的 "业务分部数据 "和 "管理层讨论 "部分，提供了有关我们业务的更多信息，包括每个分部的商誉和商誉摊销数字。我恳请您阅读这些章节，以及从第 56 页开始的查理·芒格致西科金融股东的信。

Our 1985 results include unusually large earnings from the sale of securities. This fact, in itself, does not mean that we had a particularly good year (though, of course, we did). Security profits in a given year bear similarities to a college graduation ceremony in which the knowledge gained over four years is recognized on a day when nothing further is learned. We may hold a stock for a decade or more, and during that period it may grow quite consistently in both business and market value. In the year in which we finally sell it there may be no increase in value, or there may even be a decrease. But all growth in value since purchase will be reflected in the accounting earnings of the year of sale. (If the stock owned is in our insurance subsidiaries, however, any gain or loss in market value will be reflected in net worth annually.) Thus, reported capital gains or losses in any given year are meaningless as a measure of how well we have done in the current year.

1985年业绩包含出售证券异常高的收益，但这并不代表今年就是丰收的一年（虽然事实上的确如此），出售证券收益就好像大学毕业典礼一样，四年来所学的知识在那一天正式被认可，而当天你可能一点长进都没有。我们可能持有一支股票长达十年之久，这期间其价值与价格可能以稳定的步调增长，可是在我们真正出售的那一年其价值可能一点也没变甚至还可能减少，但自购买以来累积的所有价值增长，都将反映在出售当年的会计报表中。（但如果持有股票的是我们的保险子公司，其每年市价的变动将会按要求反映在帐面之上。）总而言之，任何给定年份报表上的资本损益根本无法反映我们当年度的实际表现。

A large portion of the realized gain in 1985 ($338 million pre-tax out of a total of $488 million) came about through the sale of our General Foods shares. We held most of these shares since 1980, when we had purchased them at a price far below what we felt was their per/share business value. Year by year, the managerial efforts of Jim Ferguson and Phil Smith substantially increased General Foods’ business value and, last fall, Philip Morris made an offer for the company that reflected the increase. We thus benefited from four factors: a bargain purchase price, a business with fine underlying economics, an able management concentrating on the interests of shareholders, and a buyer willing to pay full business value. While that last factor is the only one that produces reported earnings, we consider identification of the first three to be the key to building value for Berkshire shareholders. In selecting common stocks, we devote our attention to attractive purchases, not to the possibility of attractive sales.

1985年大部分已实现的资本收益来自我们出售通用食品的股票，（税前收益4.88亿美元中的3.38亿美元）。我们从1980年开始便持有其大部分，我们当初以远低于我们认为合理的每股商业价值的价位买进，年复一年，在詹姆斯·弗格森与菲尔·史密斯管理层的优异表现大幅提升该公司的商业价值。去年秋天，菲利普·莫里斯对该公司提出并购要约，报价合理反映了公司真实的内在价值。我们的获利基于四项要素：便宜的买进价格，优秀的商业模式，专注于股东利益且勤奋能干的管理层，愿意支付完全商业价值的买家。虽然最后一项是这次获利能够一举实现的惟一因素，但我们认为，能识别出前三项的能力才是为伯克希尔股东创造价值的根本因素。在选择股票时，我们专注于如何漂亮的买进，而不是漂亮的卖出。

We have again reported substantial income from special distributions, this year from Washington Post and General Foods. (The General Foods transactions obviously took place well before the Philip Morris offer.) Distributions of this kind occur when we sell a portion of our shares in a company back to it simultaneously with its purchase of shares from other shareholders. The number of shares we sell is contractually set so as to leave our percentage ownership in the company precisely the same after the sale as before. Such a transaction is quite properly regarded by the IRS as substantially equivalent to a dividend since we, as a shareholder, receive cash while maintaining an unchanged ownership interest. This tax treatment benefits us because corporate taxpayers, unlike individual taxpayers, incur much lower taxes on dividend income than on income from long-term capital gains. (This difference will be widened further if the House-passed tax bill becomes law: under its provisions, capital gains realized by corporations will be taxed at the same rate as ordinary income.) However, accounting rules are unclear as to proper treatment for shareholder reporting. To conform with last year’s treatment, we have shown these transactions as capital gains.

今年我们又再度收到来自华盛顿邮报以及通用食品的特别股息，通用食品股息的发放是发生在菲利普·莫里斯提出并购要求之前。这种特别股息是由于公司按比例的回购我们的持股产生的，回购合约中确定的交易数量是保证公司的持股比例维持不变，这类交易被国税局认定为类似发放股息，因为我们作为股东是在保证持股比例不变的前提下收到的现金。这种税收待遇对我们有利，因为与个人纳税人不同，企业纳税人对股息收入的税率比对长期资本收益的收入低得多。(若国会通过的税收法案正式成为法律，这种差异可能会进一步扩大：相关条款规定企业实现的资本利得所适用税率与一般所得相同)，然而会计原则对于这类交易在财务报表上应如何处理却无统一看法，为与去年做法一致，在财务上我们仍将之视为资本利得。

Though we have not sought out such transactions, we have agreed to them on several occasions when managements initiated the idea. In each case we have felt that non-selling shareholders (all of whom had an opportunity to sell at the same price we received) benefited because the companies made their repurchases at prices below intrinsic business value. The tax advantages we receive and our wish to cooperate with managements that are increasing values for all shareholders have sometimes led us to sell - but only to the extent that our proportional share of the business was undiminished.

虽然我们不刻意寻求此类交易，但当管理层提出这种想法时，我们通常会举手表示赞同，虽然每次我们都觉得那些选择不卖的股东(所有股东都有权利以我们收到的价格出售)将因公司以低于内在价值的价格回购而受惠。我们获得的税收优惠以及希望与管理层合作为所有股东增加价值的愿望，使得我们不得不接受回售股份，但这仅限于我们的持股比例不变的原则之下。

At this point we usually turn to a discussion of some of our major business units. Before doing so, however, we should first look at a failure at one of our smaller businesses.⁹ Our Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, has always emphasized the study of mistakes rather than successes, both in business and other aspects of life. He does so in the spirit of the man who said: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die so I’ll never go there.” You’ll immediately see why we make a good team: Charlie likes to study errors and I have generated ample material for him, particularly in our textile and insurance businesses.

话讲到这，我们通常会接着讨论我们的主营业务，但在此之前，让我们先看看我们旗下事业一个失败的案例。我们的副主席查理·芒格，总是强调研究失败要比研究成功重要的多，无论是商业上还是人生的各个方面。他这样的精神正如有人说： 我只想知道我会死在哪里，我将永远不会去那里。你可能马上就会明白，为什么我们两个能成为好搭档：查理喜欢研究错误，而我为他提供了足够的材料，尤其是在纺织与保险业务方面。

Shutdown of Textile Business 关闭纺织业务

In July we decided to close our textile operation, and by yearend this unpleasant job was largely completed. The history of this business is instructive.

7月我们决定关闭我们的纺织业务，年底这项令人不快的工作也将基本完成，投资纺织业的历史深具启发性。

When Buffett Partnership, Ltd., an investment partnership of which I was general partner, bought control of Berkshire Hathaway 21 years ago, it had an accounting net worth of $22 million, all devoted to the textile business. The company’s intrinsic business value, however, was considerably less because the textile assets were unable to earn returns commensurate with their accounting value. Indeed, during the previous nine years (the period in which Berkshire and Hathaway operated as a merged company) aggregate sales of $530 million had produced an aggregate loss of $10 million. Profits had been reported from time to time but the net effect was always one step forward, two steps back.

21年前，我作为普通合伙人的巴菲特合伙公司收购了伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的控制权，当时公司的帐面资产为2200万美元，全部集中在纺织业务。然而当时由于公司无法赚得与帐面价值相称的回报，其内在价值远低于净资产。实际上在前9年，即伯克希尔与哈撒韦两家合并经营期间，总计5.3亿美元的营收产生了1000万美元的累计亏损，虽然时有获利，但净效应总是进一步退两步。

At the time we made our purchase, southern textile plants - largely non-union - were believed to have an important competitive advantage. Most northern textile operations had closed and many people thought we would liquidate our business as well.

在我们买下该公司的当时，南方的纺织工厂大部分没有工会组织而被公认为较具竞争优势。当大多数北方的工厂皆已结束营运时，许多人认为我们也应清算纺织业务。

We felt, however, that the business would be run much better by a long-time employee whom. We immediately selected to be president, Ken Chace. In this respect we were 100% correct: Ken and his recent successor, Garry Morrison, have been excellent managers, every bit the equal of managers at our more profitable businesses.

然而我们觉得公司若能有一位长期稳定的管理者，营运将可改善，所以当时我们马上选中肯·蔡斯接手，有关这点我们到是做对了，蔡斯跟后来接替他的加里·莫里森干得非常好，一点也不输给我们其它盈利更高的业务经营者。

In early 1967 cash generated by the textile operation was used to fund our entry into insurance via the purchase of National Indemnity Company. Some of the money came from earnings and some from reduced investment in textile inventories, receivables, and fixed assets. This pullback proved wise: although much improved by Ken’s management, the textile business never became a good earner, not even in cyclical upturns. ¹⁰

1967年初，我们利用纺织业务产生的大量现金买下国民保险公司进入保险业务，部分资金来自于利润，部分资金来自于减少纺织品存货、应收账款与固定资产的投资。这次撤退的决策事后证明完全正确，尽管在蔡斯的管理下，纺织业务已大为改善，但即使是在景气高峰的时候也没赚到钱。

Further diversification for Berkshire followed, and gradually the textile operation’s depressing effect on our overall return diminished as the business became a progressively smaller portion of the corporation. We remained in the business for reasons that I stated in the 1978 annual report (and summarized at other times also): “(1) our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment.” I further said, “As long as these conditions prevail - and we expect that they will - we intend to continue to support our textile business despite more attractive alternative uses for capital.”

随后伯克希尔进一步多元化，纺织业份额越来越小，对于公司整体的拖累也越来越轻微，而我们之所以继续保留纺织业务的原因，我早在1978年便曾提过(后来也曾陆续提到)：(1) 该公司为当地非常重要的雇主，(2) 管理层坦诚面对困境并努力解决问题，(3) 公司员工体认困境并极力配合，(4) 相对于投资，尚能产生稳定现金回报。我后来还说：只要这些情况持续不变(我们也预期不会变)，即使有更好的投资机会，我们仍会继续支持纺织业务。

It turned out that I was very wrong about (4). Though 1979 was moderately profitable, the business thereafter consumed major amounts of cash. By mid-1985 it became clear, even to me, that this condition was almost sure to continue. Could we have found a buyer who would continue operations, I would have certainly preferred to sell the business rather than liquidate it, even if that meant somewhat lower proceeds for us. But the economics that were finally obvious to me were also obvious to others, and interest was nil. ¹¹

事实证明我对第四点的判断大错特错，尽管1979年的盈利状况还不错，但此后的业务消耗了大量的现金。到1985年中期，连我自己都清楚，这种情况几乎肯定会持续下去。若我们能够找到合适的买主，即使是贱价出售也比清算要好，但我们知道的别人同样清楚，因此没人会有兴趣。

I won’t close down businesses of sub-normal profitability merely to add a fraction of a point to our corporate rate of return. However, I also feel it inappropriate for even an exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once it appears to have unending losses in prospect. Adam Smith would disagree with my first proposition, and Karl Marx would disagree with my second; the middle ground is the only position that leaves me comfortable.

我们不会仅仅为了提高我们公司的回报率而关闭盈利能力尚可但低于正常水平的企业。但同时我们还认为，即使是一家利润非常丰厚的公司，一旦出现无休止的亏损，也不应该继续向他提供资金。亚当·斯密一定不赞同我第一项的看法，而卡尔·马克思却又会反对我第二项见解，而中间立场是惟一能让我感到安心的做法。

I should reemphasize that Ken and Garry have been resourceful, energetic and imaginative in attempting to make our textile operation a success. Trying to achieve sustainable profitability, they reworked product lines, machinery configurations and distribution arrangements. We also made a major acquisition, Waumbec Mills, with the expectation of important synergy (a term widely used in business to explain an acquisition that otherwise makes no sense). But in the end nothing worked and I should be faulted for not quitting sooner. A recent Business Week article stated that 250 textile mills have closed since 1980. Their owners were not privy to any information that was unknown to me; they simply processed it more objectively. I ignored Comte’s advice - “the intellect should be the servant of the heart, but not its slave” - and believed what I preferred to believe.

我必须再次强调，蔡斯与加里两个人都极具干劲与想象力，努力使我们的纺织业务取得成功，为了使公司持续稳定获利，他们重新规划产品线、生产流程与分销商配置，同时我们还大手笔的并购了瓦姆贝克磨坊，期望发挥协同效应(商业并购中广泛使用的术语，用于解释没有意义的收购)，但最后没有一点效果，没有早点退出纺织业的错误在我。最近《商业周刊》有一篇文章提到，自1980年以来已有250家纺织公司停止运营。这些工厂股东所知道的我亦全都明了，只是他们能够更客观地看待事情，我忽略了孔德的建议：“智者应该是心灵的仆人，而非它的奴隶，“而去选择相信我更愿意相信的东西。

The domestic textile industry operates in a commodity business, competing in a world market in which substantial excess capacity exists. Much of the trouble we experienced was attributable, both directly and indirectly, to competition from foreign countries whose workers are paid a small fraction of the U.S. minimum wage. But that in no way means that our labor force deserves any blame for our closing. In fact, in comparison with employees of American industry generally, our workers were poorly paid, as has been the case throughout the textile business. In contract negotiations, union leaders and members were sensitive to our disadvantageous cost position and did not push for unrealistic wage increases or unproductive work practices. To the contrary, they tried just as hard as we did to keep us competitive. Even during our liquidation period they performed superbly. (Ironically, we would have been better off financially if our union had behaved unreasonably some years ago; we then would have recognized the impossible future that we faced, promptly closed down, and avoided significant future losses.)

国内的纺织业所面临的是全球产能过剩的大宗商品的激烈竞争，我们所面临的问题主要归因于直接或是间接来自于国外低劳力成本的竞争，这些国家的工人工资仅仅是美国最低工资的一小部分。但这绝不意味着我们的劳动力应该为我们的倒闭承担任何责任，事实上比起美国其它产业的劳工来说，整个纺织业的员工薪资水准低得可怜。在劳资协议谈判时，工会的干部与成员体会到整个产业所面临的困境，从未作出不合理的调薪要求或不符生产效益的诉求，相反地，大家都努力的想要维持竞争力，即使在公司清算期间，他们仍极力配合。而讽刺的是，如果工会表现的过分一些，使我们早一点看清行业的不利前景而立刻关厂，我们的损失可能会少一点。

Over the years, we had the option of making large capital expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised greater economic benefits than would have resulted from comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and newspaper businesses.

多年来，我们一再面临投入大量的资本支出以降低变动成本的抉择，每次提出的投资企划看起来都稳赚不赔，以标准的投资回报率来看，甚至比起我们高回报的糖果与新闻事业还好的多。

But the promised benefits from these textile investments were illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, each company’s capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes). After each round of investment, all the players had more money in the game and returns remained anemic.

但事实证明这些预期回报只是一种幻象。因为我们许多国内外竞争者同样也都在加大资本投入力度，使得降低的成本被迫全数反应在售价之上。单独来看，每家公司的资本支出计划看起来都具有成本效益和合理性，但再从整体上看，其效益完全被抵销掉而变得很不合理，就好像每个观看游行的人都认为踮起脚尖可以看得更清楚一样。每一轮投资过后，所有的竞争者押注的金额越来越高，但投资回报却一点也不见起色。

Thus, we faced a miserable choice: huge capital investment would have helped to keep our textile business alive, but would have left us with terrible returns on ever-growing amounts of capital. After the investment, moreover, the foreign competition would still have retained a major, continuing advantage in labor costs. A refusal to invest, however, would make us increasingly non-competitive, even measured against domestic textile manufacturers. I always thought myself in the position described by Woody Allen in one of his movies: “More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.”

因此，我们面临着一个悲惨的选择：大笔的资本支出虽然可以令我们的纺织业务得以存活，但糟糕的投资回报却是少得可怜，而且不断的资本投入依然要面对国外持续的低成本的强力竞争。若不再继续投资，将使我们更不具竞争力，即使是与国内同行相比亦是如此。我觉得自己就好象处于伍迪·艾伦在他某一部电影中所描述的位置：比起历史上的任何一刻，此时人类处在面临抉择的路口，一条通往绝望的深渊，而另一条则通往毁灭，让我们祈祷有足够的智慧去作正确的决定。

For an understanding of how the to-invest-or-not-to-invest dilemma plays out in a commodity business, it is instructive to look at Burlington Industries, by far the largest U.S. textile company both 21 years ago and now. In 1964 Burlington had sales of $1.2 billion against our $50 million. It had strengths in both distribution and production that we could never hope to match and also, of course, had an earnings record far superior to ours. Its stock sold at 60 at the end of 1964; ours was 13.

想要了解在大宗商品业务中是否应该继续投入资本，不妨看看伯灵顿工业，21年来都是美国最大的纺织公司，1964年该公司的营业额约为12亿美元，而我们是5000万美元，他们在分销与生产方面都拥有我们永远无法比拟的优势，利润数字也比我们要好看得多，当时它的股价为60美元，我们是13美元。

Burlington made a decision to stick to the textile business, and in 1985 had sales of about $2.8 billion. During the 1964-85 period, the company made capital expenditures of about $3 billion, far more than any other U.S. textile company and more than $200-per-share on that $60 stock. A very large part of the expenditures, I am sure, was devoted to cost improvement and expansion. Given Burlington’s basic commitment to stay in textiles, I would also surmise that the company’s capital decisions were quite rational.

之后伯灵顿工业坚守纺织本业，1985年营业额达到28亿美金。1964-1985年间，该公司累计资本支出约30亿美元，远远超过美国任何一家纺织公司，这相当于向1964年底60美元的每股股价累计投入资本超过200美元。我相信其大部分资本用于降低成本与扩张之上，鉴于公司固守本业的承诺，这种投资决策属于是合理的。

Nevertheless, Burlington has lost sales volume in real dollars and has far lower returns on sales and equity now than 20 years ago. Split 2-for-1 in 1965, the stock now sells at 34 -- on an adjusted basis, just a little over its $60 price in 1964. Meanwhile, the CPI has more than tripled. Therefore, each share commands about one-third the purchasing power it did at the end of 1964. Regular dividends have been paid but they, too, have shrunk significantly in purchasing power.

尽管如此，与20年前相比，以实际美元购买力计算，伯灵顿现在的实际销售数字有所下降，而且毛利率与股本回报率也大不如前。而该公司现在的股价仅仅是34美元，考虑到1965年一分二扩股，大约略高于当年的60美元，而在此同时，消费者物价指数CPI却早已是当年的三倍，因此每股购买力约为1964年底的三分之一，虽然每年有固定的股息发放，但购买力同样大幅缩水。

This devastating outcome for the shareholders indicates what can happen when much brain power and energy are applied to a faulty premise. The situation is suggestive of Samuel Johnson’s horse: “A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse - not a remarkable mathematician.” Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company - but not a remarkable business.

对股东而言，这个最悲惨的结局表明，花费大量人力物力在错误的产业将会导致什么后果。这种情况有如塞缪尔·约翰逊的那匹马：一只能数到十的马是只了不起的马，却不是了不起的数学家。同样的，一家能够合理配置资本的纺织公司是一家了不起的纺织公司，但却不是一家了不起的企业。

My conclusion from my own experiences and from much observation of other businesses is that a good managerial record (measured by economic returns) is far more a function of what business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row (though intelligence and effort help considerably, of course, in any business, good or bad). Some years ago I wrote: “When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.” Nothing has since changed my point of view on that matter. Should you find yourself in a chronically-leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.

根据我个人的经验和对其他企业的大量观察，我得出一个结论：从经济回报来衡量，一项优异的企业经营记录的背后，你划的是一条怎样的船远比你怎样去划更重要。当然不管企业是好是坏，努力与才能也都很重要。几年前我曾说：当一个以管理著称的管理层遇到一家不具前景的糟糕公司时，通常是后者会占上风。如今我的看法依然不变，当你处于一艘长期漏水的破船上，与其费力修补破洞，还不如把精力放在如何换条好船之上。

There is an investment postscript in our textile saga. Some investors weight book value heavily in their stock-buying decisions (as I, in my early years, did myself). And some economists and academicians believe replacement values are of considerable importance in calculating an appropriate price level for the stock market as a whole. Those of both persuasions would have received an education at the auction we held in early 1986 to dispose of our textile machinery.

在说完我们纺织业的投资传奇后，我想说几句投资忠告。一些投资者在他们的股票购买决策中非常重视账面价值(正如我早年所做的那样)，并且一些经济学家和学者认为，重置价值对于计算整个股票市场的适当价格水平具有相当重要的意义。关于这两种说法在经过1986年初拍卖纺织机器设备后，给我好好地上了一课。

The equipment sold (including some disposed of in the few months prior to the auction) took up about 750,000 square feet of factory space in New Bedford and was eminently usable. It originally cost us about $13 million, including $2 million spent in 1980-84, and had a current book value of $866,000 (after accelerated depreciation). Though no sane management would have made the investment, the equipment could have been replaced new for perhaps $30-$50 million.

卖掉的设备(包括几个月前已经卖掉的一部分)堆满了新贝德福德75万英尺的厂房空间，这些设备皆为可用。原始成本为1300万美金，包括近几年投入的200万，经加速折旧后，帐面价值为86.6万美元。虽然没有人会笨到投资纺织业，但要买一套这样的全新的设备也要花3-5千万美金。

Gross proceeds from our sale of this equipment came to $163,122. Allowing for necessary pre- and post-sale costs, our net was less than zero. Relatively modern looms that we bought for $5,000 apiece in 1981 found no takers at $50. We finally sold them for scrap at $26 each, a sum less than removal costs.

但你知道吗？我们出售此套设备的总收益为163,122美元，考虑到必要的售前和售后成本，净收益为负。我们在1981年以每台5000美元的价格购买的相对现代的织布机，现在以50美元处理却无人问津。最后只能以26美元作为废品卖掉，这连拆除的成本都不够。

Ponder this: the economic goodwill attributable to two paper routes in Buffalo - or a single See’s candy store - considerably exceeds the proceeds we received from this massive collection of tangible assets that not too many years ago, under different competitive conditions, was able to employ over 1,000 people.

作为对比：两条布法罗报纸的分销线路或一家喜诗糖果店铺所能发挥的无形经济商誉价值远远超过我们从大量有形资产中获得的回报，而这些有形资产在几年之前不同的经济环境之下，却能一口气雇用上千人。

Three Very Good Businesses (and a Few Thoughts About Incentive Compensation) 三家非常优秀的企业（以及关于激励性薪酬的几点思考）

When I was 12, I lived with my grandfather for about four months. A grocer by trade, he was also working on a book and each night he dictated a few pages to me. The title - brace yourself - was “How to Run a Grocery Store and a Few Things I Have Learned About Fishing”. My grandfather was sure that interest in these two subjects was universal and that the world awaited his views. You may conclude from this section’s title and contents that I was overexposed to Grandpa’s literary style (and personality).

记得12岁时我和爷爷一起住了大概有4个月，那时他开了一家杂货店，他正在写一本书，每晚都会念几页给我听，书名很大气，叫《如何经营一家杂货店与我从钓鱼上学到的一些事》，我爷爷以为所有人对于这两件事一定都会感兴趣，且全世界一定都会看重他的想法。通过本节的标题和内容，你一定会觉得我的写作风格(也包含个性)完全承袭了我爷爷。

I am merging the discussion of Nebraska Furniture Mart, See’s Candy Shops, and Buffalo Evening News here because the economic strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of these businesses have changed little since I reported to you a year ago. The shortness of this discussion, however, is in no way meant to minimize the importance of these businesses to us: in 1985 they earned an aggregate of $72 million pre-tax. Fifteen years ago, before we had acquired any of them, their aggregate earnings were about $8 million pre-tax.

我把内布拉斯家具城、喜诗糖果与布法罗报纸摆在一起谈是因为我认为这几家企业的竞争优势、劣势与产业前景跟我一年前报告的一样，一点都没有改变，简短的叙述不代表它们占我们公司的重要性有丝毫的减损。在1985年合计税前净利润为7200万美元，在十五年前还未买下它们之前，此数字为800万美元。

While an increase in earnings from $8 million to $72 million sounds terrific - and usually is - you should not automatically assume that to be the case. You must first make sure that earnings were not severely depressed in the base year. If they were instead substantial in relation to capital employed, an even more important point must be examined: how much additional capital was required to produce the additional earnings?

虽然利润从800万到7200万看起来好象很惊人(事实上也是)，但你千万不要以为本来就是这样。首先你必须确定基期数据没有失真低估，其次，如果盈利相对于投入资本来说是很可观的(高ROIC)，则必须研究一个更重要的问题：产生额外收益需要再投入多少额外资本？

In both respects, our group of three scores well. First, earnings 15 years ago were excellent compared to capital then employed in the businesses. Second, although annual earnings are now $64 million greater, the businesses require only about $40 million more in invested capital to operate than was the case then.

关于这两点，这三家公司完全经得起考验。相对于其所占用的资本，十五年前它们所产生的收益就颇为可观。现在虽然增加了6400万收益，但企业运营额外累计投入的资本也只有4000万美金而已。

The dramatic growth in earning power of these three businesses, accompanied by their need for only minor amounts of capital, illustrates very well the power of economic goodwill during an inflationary period (a phenomenon explained in detail in the 1983 annual report). The financial characteristics of these businesses have allowed us to use a very large portion of the earnings they generate elsewhere. Corporate America, however, has had a different experience: in order to increase earnings significantly, most companies have needed to increase capital significantly also. The average American business has required about $5 of additional capital to generate an additional $1 of annual pre-tax earnings. That business, therefore, would have required over $300 million in additional capital from its owners in order to achieve an earnings performance equal to our group of three.

这三个企业的盈利能力急剧增长，同时它们只需要增加少量的资本，原因在于高通膨时期经济商誉所能发挥的魔力，我们在1983年报中有详细解释，这些公司的经济特性使得我们可以将他们所赚到的大部分收益用在别的投资之上。然而美国企业界却是另外一种状况：为了大幅提高获利，大部分公司需要再投入大量的资本。为了增加1美元的税前收益，平均需要再投入5美元资本。等于要额外再投入3亿美元，才能达到我们这三家公司目前的获利水准。

When returns on capital are ordinary, an earn-more-by-putting-up-more record is no great managerial achievement. You can get the same result personally while operating from your rocking chair. Just quadruple the capital you commit to a savings account and you will quadruple your earnings. You would hardly expect hosannas for that particular accomplishment. Yet, retirement announcements regularly sing the praises of CEOs who have, say, quadrupled earnings of their widget company during their reign - with no one examining whether this gain was attributable simply to many years of retained earnings and the workings of compound interest.

当资本回报率平平，这种建立在更多资本投入之上的盈利增长并不是什么伟大的管理成就。你躺在摇椅上也能轻松做出这样的成绩，只要你将存入银行的资金翻倍，你的利息就会翻倍，没有人会对这样的成果报以掌声。但通常我们在某位资深主管的退休仪式上，歌颂他在任内将公司的收益数字提高数倍，却没人会去看看这一成果事实上只是因为公司每年所累积收益与复利所产生的效果。

If the widget company consistently earned a superior return on capital throughout the period, or if capital employed only doubled during the CEO’s reign, the praise for him may be well deserved. But if return on capital was lackluster and capital employed increased in pace with earnings, applause should be withheld. A savings account in which interest was reinvested would achieve the same year-by-year increase in earnings - and, at only 8% interest, would quadruple its annual earnings in 18 years.

当然若那家公司在此期间以有限的资金赚取极高的报酬或是只增加一点资金便创造更多的收益，则他所得到的掌声是名符其实。但若资本回报率低迷，而投入的资本随着收入的增长而增加，那么就应该把掌声收回，因为只要把存在银行所赚的8%利息再继续存着，18年后你的利息收入自然翻倍。

The power of this simple math is often ignored by companies to the detriment of their shareholders. Many corporate compensation plans reward managers handsomely for earnings increases produced solely, or in large part, by retained earnings - i.e., earnings withheld from owners. For example, ten-year, fixed-price stock options are granted routinely, often by companies whose dividends are only a small percentage of earnings.

这种简单的算术问题常常被公司管理层忽视，从而损害其股东的利益。许多公司的奖励计划随随便便就大方的犒赏公司主管，事实上公司的收益增长完全或大部分是由留存收益产生的——即从所有者那里扣留的收益。例如十年固定价格的认股权通常由股息率极低的公司授予。

An example will illustrate the inequities possible under such circumstances. Let’s suppose that you had a $100,000 savings account earning 8% interest and “managed” by a trustee who could decide each year what portion of the interest you were to be paid in cash. Interest not paid out would be “retained earnings” added to the savings account to compound. And let’s suppose that your trustee, in his superior wisdom, set the “pay-out ratio” at one-quarter of the annual earnings.

有一个例子可以用来说明这其中的不合理性，假设你有一个本金10万美元利率8%的银行账户，交由一位理财经理“管理”，该理财经理决定每年以现金支付您的利息是多少。未支付的利息则继续存在银行利滚利，让我们假设理财经理以其卓越的智慧将"支付比率"设定为年收入的25%。

Under these assumptions, your account would be worth $179,084 at the end of ten years. Additionally, your annual earnings would have increased about 70% from $8,000 to $13,515 under this inspired management. And, finally, your “dividends” would have increased commensurately, rising regularly from $2,000 in the first year to $3,378 in the tenth year. Each year, when your manager’s public relations firm prepared his annual report to you, all of the charts would have had lines marching skyward.

最后让我来看看十年之后你会得到什么：十年后你的账户余额是179,084美元，此外在理财经理的精心管理下，你每年收到的利息从2,000增加到3,378美元，而你整体年收入从8,000增加到13,515美元。每年你的理财经理向你提交的年度报告中，所有的图表都是一条上升的直线。

Now, just for fun, let’s push our scenario one notch further and give your trustee-manager a ten-year fixed-price option on part of your “business” (i.e., your savings account) based on its fair value in the first year. With such an option, your manager would reap a substantial profit at your expense - just from having held on to most of your earnings. If he were both Machiavellian and a bit of a mathematician, your manager might also have cut the pay-out ratio once he was firmly entrenched.

现在让我们再作进一步假设，你与理财经理签订的管理合约中有一项约定：赋予理财经理十年内固定价格的认股权利。现在你会发现，理财经理仅仅通过保留你的大部分利息的方式，就从你的口袋中大捞了一笔。如果他既是马基雅维利主义者，又有点数学基础的话，那么他一旦站稳脚跟，就可能会降低你的派息比例。

This scenario is not as farfetched as you might think. Many stock options in the corporate world have worked in exactly that fashion: they have gained in value simply because management retained earnings, not because it did well with the capital in its hands.

这种情况你不要以为不大可能，企业界的许多股票期权正是以这种方式运作的：公司业绩上涨仅仅是因为管理层留存收益，而不是因为他们的资本运营表现良好。

Managers actually apply a double standard to options. Leaving aside warrants (which deliver the issuing corporation immediate and substantial compensation), I believe it is fair to say that nowhere in the business world are ten-year fixed-price options on all or a portion of a business granted to outsiders. Ten months, in fact, would be regarded as extreme. It would be particularly unthinkable for managers to grant a long-term option on a business that was regularly adding to its capital. Any outsider wanting to secure such an option would be required to pay fully for capital added during the option period.

而事实上，公司高管对于期权采用双重标准，撇开认股权即时巨额补偿不谈，我认为公平地说，在商业世界中，没有任何一家公司会向局外人授予全部或部分业务的十年固定价