2010年巴菲特致股东信

📜 一、2010年股东信背景与历史脉络

📊 1. 当年美股三大指数表现

🏆 2. 当年全市场表现 Top 5 行业与热门领涨股票（含真实涨跌幅）

• 表现最佳 Top 5 行业/板块及涨幅：移动互联网与云计算 (+48%)、汽车与交通装备 (+38%)、消费电子 (+32%)、工业制造 (+26%)、能源 (+20%)
• 表现最佳 Top 5 领涨股票及具体涨幅：Apple (+53%)、Netflix (+219%)、BNSF (收购完成)、Cummins (+78%)、Caterpillar (+65%)

3. 宏观与资本市场环境

美股强劲复苏，欧洲主权债务危机（希腊爆雷）开始阴云笼罩。

4. 伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司动态

BNSF铁路公司整合非常成功，带来丰厚现金流；伯克希尔业绩大幅回升；托德·库姆斯（Todd Combs）被录用为投资经理（接班人计划一步）。

5. 当年重大历史事件与新闻

希腊债务危机引发欧债危机；英国石油公司（BP）墨西哥湾漏油事故；苹果发布iPad。

💡 二、2010年股东信核心要点与投资思想影响

1. 投资团队接班人计划启动：寻找具备独立思考、道德高尚、能识别尾部风险的投资人才（Todd Combs & Ted Weschler）。

2. 深刻阐述生产性资产（Productive Assets，如企业、农场、铁路）远胜于非生产性资产（如黄金、加密货币或无收益资产）。

📄 三、2010年致股东信原文与中文对照

原文信息：

• 标题：2010 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
• 作者：Warren Buffett
• 发表时间：2011-02-26
• 链接：PDF
• 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
• 整理：Hilary_和瑞
• 校译：

Berkshire's Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

注： 数据为日历年数据，但以下情况除外： 1965 年和 1966 年为截至 9/30 的年度；1967 年为截至 12/31 的 15 个月。

Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.

从 1979 年开始，会计规则要求保险公司按市价而不是按成本与市价孰低法对其持有的股权证券进行估值。在本表中，伯克希尔公司截至 1978 年的业绩已经重报，以符合变更后的规则。在所有其他方面，结果均按最初报告的数字计算。

The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

标准普尔500指数的数字是税前，而伯克希尔公司的数字是税后。如果伯克希尔这样的公司只是拥有标准普尔 500 指数，并缴纳相应的税款，那么在该指数出现正收益的年份，其业绩将落后于标准普尔 500 指数，但在该指数出现负收益的年份，其业绩将超过标准普尔 500 指数。长年累月下来，税收成本会导致总的落后幅度很大。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 13% in 2010. Over the last 46 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $95,453, a rate of 20.2% compounded annually.^*

公司 2010 年的账面价值增加 49 亿美元， A/B 股每股的账面价值增长了 13%(标普 21.4%)，自现任管理层接手的 46 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 95453 美元，年复合成长率约为 20.2%。

^*. All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A. ↩

The highlight of 2010 was our acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe, a purchase that’s working out even better than I expected. It now appears that owning this railroad will increase Berkshire’s “normal” earning power by nearly 40% pre-tax and by well over 30% after-tax. Making this purchase increased our share count by 6% and used $22 billion of cash. Since we’ve quickly replenished the cash, the economics of this transaction have turned out very well.

2010 年的亮点是公司收购了 BNSF 铁路公司(BurlingtonNorthernSantaFe)，该项收购比我预期的要顺利。现在看来，收购这条铁路将使伯克希尔"常规"盈利能力税前增长 40%，税后增长超过 30%。这起收购让我们的股 票数量增加 6%，花费了 220 亿美元的现金。由于我们迅速补充了现金，该项交易的经济效益最终表现非常好。

A “normal year,” of course, is not something that either Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of Berkshire and my partner, or I can define with anything like precision. But for the purpose of estimating our current earning power, we are envisioning a year free of a mega-catastrophe in insurance and possessing a general business climate somewhat better than that of 2010 but weaker than that of 2005 or 2006. Using these assumptions, and several others that I will explain in the “Investment” section, I can estimate that the normal earning power of the assets we currently own is about $17 billion pre-tax and $12 billion after-tax, excluding any capital gains or losses. Every day Charlie and I think about how we can build on this base.

当然，我的合伙人、伯克希尔的副董事长查理·芒格也是我的合伙人，或者我本人，都很难精确定义到底什么 才是"一个正常年份"。但是，为了估算我们现有的盈利能力，我们对于正常年份的设想是，在保险生意方面不存 在巨大灾难， 总体经济环境好于 2010 年，但却弱于 2005 年或 2006 年。按照这样的假设和其他我在"投资"部分阐述的其他几个假设，我估计公司目前所拥有资产的正常盈利能力为，税前 170 亿美元或税后 120 亿美元，不包括任何资本损益。 查理和我每天都在思考如何增强公司的盈利能力。

Both of us are enthusiastic about BNSF’s future because railroads have major cost and environmental advantages over trucking, their main competitor. Last year BNSF moved each ton of freight it carried a record 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. That’s three times more fuel-efficient than trucking is, which means our railroad owns an important advantage in operating costs. Concurrently, our country gains because of reduced greenhouse emissions and a much smaller need for imported oil. When traffic travels by rail, society benefits.

我们两人都对 BNSF 的前景持乐观的态度，因为与其主要的竞争对手卡车运输相比， 铁路存在巨大的成本和 环境优势。在 2010 年，BNSF 每吨货物运输的成本为 1 加仑柴油/500 英里，比卡车运输省油三倍，这意味着公 司的铁路运输拥有巨大的运营成本优势。同时，降低温室气体排放量，减少对进口石油的需求量，将使得我们的 国家受益。铁路运输使整个社会受益。

Over time, the movement of goods in the United States will increase, and BNSF should get its full share of the gain. The railroad will need to invest massively to bring about this growth, but no one is better situated than Berkshire to supply the funds required. However slow the economy, or chaotic the markets, our checks will clear.

随着时间的推移，美国境内的货物运输将会增加， BNSF 将会实现其全部收益。为了实现这种收益，需要对铁路进行巨额投资， 伯克希尔是最佳的资金供给者。不管经济增长多么缓慢，市场如何动荡，我们的支票都将兑付。

Last year -- in the face of widespread pessimism about our economy -- we demonstrated our enthusiasm for capital investment at Berkshire by spending $6 billion on property and equipment. Of this amount, $5.4 billion -- or 90% of the total -- was spent in the United States. Certainly our businesses will expand abroad in the future, but an overwhelming part of their future investments will be at home. In 2011, we will set a new record for capital spending -- $8 billion -- and spend all of the $2 billion increase in the United States.

2010 年，在大家都不看好美国经济的情况下， 伯克希尔显示了对资本投资的热情，花费了 60 亿美元进行不动产和设备投资，其中 90%约 54 亿美元投资在美国境内。当然，公司的业务在将来将会扩张，但是绝大多数投资还将位于美国境内。在 2011 年，我们将创造 80 亿美元资本支出的新记录，所增加的 20 亿美元将全部投资于美国境内。

Money will always flow toward opportunity, and there is an abundance of that in America. Commentators today often talk of “great uncertainty.” But think back, for example, to December 6, 1941, October 18, 1987 and September 10, 2001. No matter how serene today may be, tomorrow is always uncertain.

资本总是在追逐机会，而美国存在大量的机会。 现在的评论员总会说美国有"巨大的不确定性"。但是回想一下 1941 年 12 月 6 日， 1987 年 10 月 18 日， 2001 年 9 月 10 日。无论今天如何平静，未来总是存在不确定性。

Don’t let that reality spook you. Throughout my lifetime, politicians and pundits have constantly moaned about terrifying problems facing America. Yet our citizens now live an astonishing six times better than when I was born. The prophets of doom have overlooked the all-important factor that is certain: Human potential is far from exhausted, and the American system for unleashing that potential -- a system that has worked wonders for over two centuries despite frequent interruptions for recessions and even a Civil War -- remains alive and effective.

不要让那样的现实吓坏了你。在我的整个一生中，政客和学者们一直都抱怨和夸大美国面临的可怕问题。然而，与我出生之时相比，美国民众的生活水平惊人的提高了 6 倍。那些悲观论者忽视了一个至关重要的因素：人类的潜能是取之不尽用之不竭的，尽管时不时受到经济衰退甚至内战的干扰，但用来释放这种潜能的美国制度依然充满活力和效率。

We are not natively smarter than we were when our country was founded nor do we work harder. But look around you and see a world beyond the dreams of any colonial citizen. Now, as in 1776, 1861, 1932 and 1941, America’s best days lie ahead.

我们并没有比建国时更加聪慧，工作更加努力。但是，环顾四周你会看到， 世界已经超越了殖民时代民众的梦想。现在，正如 1776、 1861、 1932 和 1941 年一样，美国人的好日子还在前头。

Performance 业绩

Charlie and I believe that those entrusted with handling the funds of others should establish performance goals at the onset of their stewardship. Lacking such standards, managements are tempted to shoot the arrow of performance and then paint the bull’s-eye around wherever it lands.

查理和我认为， 那些受托管理别人资金的人， 应该在其工作伊始就确定绩效目标。如果缺乏业绩标准，管理层将会倾向先射出业绩之箭，然后在周围画上靶心。

In Berkshire’s case, we long ago told you that our job is to increase per-share intrinsic value at a rate greater than the increase (including dividends) of the S&P 500. In some years we succeed; in others we fail. But, if we are unable over time to reach that goal, we have done nothing for our investors, who by themselves could have realized an equal or better result by owning an index fund.

就伯克希尔而言，我们很早就告诉过大家，我们的目标是， 使每股内在价值增长超过标准普尔 500 指数(含股息)。在有些年份我们超过了，但也有一些年份我们没有超过。 但是，如果随着时间推移， 我们无法达到这一目标，我们就没有为我们的投资者带来任何东西，他们完全可以通过购买一只指数基金来实现同等的或者更好的回报。

The challenge, of course, is the calculation of intrinsic value. Present that task to Charlie and me separately, and you will get two different answers. Precision just isn’t possible.

当然，如何计算内在价值也是一项挑战。将这个问题交给查理和我，你将得到两个不同的答案。想要精确是不可能的。

To eliminate subjectivity, we therefore use an understated proxy for intrinsic-value -- book value -- when measuring our performance. To be sure, some of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying value on our books. (Later in this report, we’ll present a case study.) But since that premium seldom swings wildly from year to year, book value can serve as a reasonable device for tracking how we are doing.

为了消除主观性，我们在衡量业绩时， 采用账面价值作为内在价值的一个低估的替代指标。可以肯定的是， 我们的一些业务价值远远超过他们的账面价值。 (在这份报告的后半部分，将介绍一个案例研究)。 因为内在价值相比账面价值的溢价， 每年很少巨幅波动， 所以，账面价值可以作为衡量我们表现的一个合理工具。

The table on page 2 shows our 46-year record against the S&P, a performance quite good in the earlier years and now only satisfactory. The bountiful years, we want to emphasize, will never return. The huge sums of capital we currently manage eliminate any chance of exceptional performance. We will strive, however, for better-than-average results and feel it fair for you to hold us to that standard.

首页的业绩对比表说明了 46 年以来， 伯克希尔相对于标准普尔 500 指数的业绩变化。在早期年份， 伯克希尔的业绩非常好，而现在的业绩只能说是令人满意。我们在此想强调的是，那些富饶的年份已经一去不复返。我们目前管理的巨额资本已经不存在任何实现非凡的业绩的可能性。然而，我们将竭尽所能，使得业绩超过平均水平。达到这个标准对你们来说是公平的。

Yearly figures, it should be noted, are neither to be ignored nor viewed as all-important. The pace of the earth’s movement around the sun is not synchronized with the time required for either investment ideas or operating decisions to bear fruit. At GEICO, for example, we enthusiastically spent $900 million last year on advertising to obtain policyholders who deliver us no immediate profits. If we could spend twice that amount productively, we would happily do so though short-term results would be further penalized. Many large investments at our railroad and utility operations are also made with an eye to payoffs well down the road.

需要注意的是，我们不应该忽略年度数据，也不应该过于看重。地球绕太阳公转的速度， 与投资理念和运营决策产生业绩所需的时间并不同步。例如，在 GEICO，我们 2010 年的广告支出高达 9000 万美元，而所吸引的保险客户并没有立即为我们带来利润。如果我们的广告支出能够有效的翻番，我们将很高兴这么做， 即使短期业绩将进一步承压。在对铁路和公用事业进行大额投资的时候，我们也着眼于未来的回报。

To provide you a longer-term perspective on performance, we present on the facing page the yearly figures from page 2 recast into a series of five-year periods. Overall, there are 42 of these periods, and they tell an interesting story. On a comparative basis, our best years ended in the early 1980s. The market’s golden period, however, came in the 17 following years, with Berkshire achieving stellar absolute returns even as our relative advantage narrowed.

为了让你们对业绩有一个更长远的看法，我们重新编制了首页的年度业绩对比数据， 以 5 年为期总共 42 期， 它们讲述了一个有趣的故事。比较来看，我们最好的年份结束于 1980 年代。然而，接下来的 17 年是市场的黄金时期。 尽管我们的相对优势缩小，但伯克希尔仍然取得了惊人的绝对回报。

After 1999, the market stalled (or have you already noticed that?). Consequently, the satisfactory performance relative to the S&P that Berkshire has achieved since then has delivered only moderate absolute results.

1999 年之后市场停滞(不知道你们是否注意到这一点？ )，因此，从那时起， 伯克希尔所实现的相对于标普 500 指数的令人满意的回报率， 只带来了温和的绝对收益。

Looking forward, we hope to average several points better than the S&P -- though that result is, of course, far from a sure thing. If we succeed in that aim, we will almost certainly produce better relative results in bad years for the stock market and suffer poorer results in strong markets.

展望未来，我们希望伯克希尔所实现的收益率能够比标普 500 指数平均高几个点，尽管这远非确

定。如果我们达到了这个目标，几乎可以肯定， 在股市低迷的年份， 我们将实现较好的相对业绩，而在股市狂热的年份则会相对较差。

Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 by Five-Year Periods

Notes: The first two periods cover the five years beginning September 30 of the previous year. The third period covers 63 months beginning September 30, 1966 to December 31, 1971. All other periods involve calendar years.

注： 前两期涵盖始于前一年 9 月 30 日的五年，第三期涵盖从 1966 年 9 月 30 日到 1971 年 12 月 31 日的 63 个月。

The other notes on page 2 also apply to this table.

其他所有年份均为公历年份。

Intrinsic Value -- Today and Tomorrow 内在价值的今天和明天

Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value cannot be precisely calculated, two of its three key pillars can be measured. Charlie and I rely heavily on these measurements when we make our own estimates of Berkshire’s value.

尽管我们无法准确计算伯克希尔的内在价值，但是，对于其三个关键因素，我们可以衡量其中的两个。查理和我在评估伯克希尔内在价值的时候，特别依赖这些因素。

The first component of value is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $158 billion at market value.

公司内在价值的第一个组成部分是我们的投资， 包括股票、债券和现金等价物。期末，这些投资的市场价值为 1580 亿美元。

Insurance float -- money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us -- funds $66 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, underwriting results are volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, though, we’ve been significantly profitable, and I also expect us to average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, all of our investments -- those funded both by float and by retained earnings -- can be viewed as an element of value for Berkshire shareholders.

保险浮存金是在保险业务中我们所临时持有的不属于我们的货币。保险浮存金为我们的投资提供了 660 亿美元的资金。只要保险承保能盈亏平衡，这些钱就是免费的，也就是说，我们收取的保费能覆盖我们所产生赔付损失和运营成本。当然，保险承保损益波动不定。然而，纵观伯克希尔的整个历史，我们一直保持盈利。在将来，我也希望我们能够实现盈亏平衡或更好的结果。如果达到了这一点， 那些由保险浮存金和留存收益提供资金的投资， 都可以视为伯克希尔股东价值的重要组成部分。

Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance underwriting. These earnings are delivered by our 68 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 106. In Berkshire’s early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we’ve increasingly emphasized the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses, a practice that will continue.

公司内在价值的第二个组成部分是来自于投资和保险承保之外的其他收益。 它们来自于 68 家非保险公司，在之后有详细说明。在伯克希尔的早期，我们专注于投资。然而，在过去 20 年间，我们越来越强调拓展来自于非保险业务的收益。 这个战略我们将继续下去。

The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first table, we present per-share investments at decade intervals beginning in 1970, three years after we entered the insurance business. We exclude those investments applicable to minority interests.

下表表明了这种改变。在表中，我们从 1970 年开始(即我们进入保险业 3 年后)， 以 10 年为期列出了每股投资和每股经营收益(不包括少数股东权益)。

Though our compounded annual increase in per-share investments was a healthy 19.9% over the 40-year period, our rate of increase has slowed sharply as we have focused on using funds to buy operating businesses.

尽管在这 40 年， 我们每股投资年复合增长率达到惊人的 19.9%， 然而，由于近年来我们集中资金专注于购买经营业务，每股投资年增长率急速下降。

The payoff from this shift is shown in the following table, which illustrates how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have increased, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.

表中每股税前经营收益， 印证了我们非保险业务的收益是如何增长的。

For the forty years, our compounded annual gain in pre-tax, non-insurance earnings per share is 21.0%. During the same period, Berkshire’s stock price increased at a rate of 22.1% annually. Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in rough tandem with Berkshire’s investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths -- sometimes for extended periods -- but eventually they meet.

40 年来， 伯克希尔非保险业务每股税前收益年复合增长率为 21.0%，公司股价同期年复合增长率为 22.1%。随着时间的推移，你就会发现公司的股价变动与伯克希尔的投资和收益变动大致同步。市场价格和内在价值遵循的路径经常不同， 尽管有时交汇时间很漫长，但它们终将交汇。

There is a third, more subjective, element to an intrinsic value calculation that can be either positive or negative: the efficacy with which retained earnings will be deployed in the future. We, as well as many other businesses, are likely to retain earnings over the next decade that will equal, or even exceed, the capital we presently employ. Some companies will turn these retained dollars into fifty-cent pieces, others into two-dollar bills.

内在价值计算还涉及第三个因素： 未来留存收益的使用效率。 这个要素主观性比较强，可以是积极的，也可以是消极的。 我们以及其他众多企业一样， 很可能在未来十年内，保留的收益将等于甚至超过， 我们目前所使用的资本。 其中有些公司从每 1 美元的留存收益中收回 50 美分，而有些公司则收回 2 美元。

This “what-will-they-do-with-the-money” factor must always be evaluated along with the “what-do-we-have-now” calculation in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company’s intrinsic value. That’s because an outside investor stands by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company’s earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the reinvestment prospects add to the company’s current value; if the CEO’s talents or motives are suspect, today’s value must be discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck’s or Montgomery Ward’s CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.

为了让我们或任何人能够合理地估计一家企业的内在价值， "他们将用留存收益做些什么"这个因素，必须与前面两个"我们现在拥有什么"的计算，一起进行评估。 这是因为当管理层使用其在公司部分收益进行再投资时，外部投资者只能旁观。如果一名 CEO 能够胜任这项工作，再投资前景将增加企业的当前价值，如果 CEO 的能力和动机受到怀疑，那么当前的价值将大打折扣。 其结果的差异可能是巨大的。 1960 年代， 交给 Sears 公司或Montgomery 公司的 CEO 的每一美元， 与交给沃尔玛公司 Sam Walton 的相比， 其结局真是大相径庭。

Charlie and I hope that the per-share earnings of our non-insurance businesses continue to increase at a decent rate. But the job gets tougher as the numbers get larger. We will need both good performance from our current businesses and more major acquisitions. We’re prepared. Our elephant gun has been reloaded, and my trigger finger is itchy.

查理和我希望我们非保险业务的每股收益能够以令人满意的适度增长。但是， 随着数字越来越大， 工作变得越来越困难。我们不仅希望当前业务经营良好，还希望出现更多大宗收购。我们整装待发，猎象之枪已经上膛，扣住扳机的手指正发痒痒。

Partially offsetting our anchor of size are several important advantages we have. First, we possess a cadre of truly skilled managers who have an unusual commitment to their own operations and to Berkshire. Many of our CEOs are independently wealthy and work only because they love what they do. They are volunteers, not mercenaries. Because no one can offer them a job they would enjoy more, they can’t be lured away.

我们所具备的一些重要优势部分抵消了我们的庞大规模。首先，我们拥有一批能力出众的管理人才，他们对自身的业务运营以及伯克希尔忠诚无比。 我们的许多 CEO 都很富有，他们工作的唯一原因是出于对本职工作的热爱。他们是自愿的，而非为钱而来。 因为没有人能够给他们提供一份更他们喜欢的工作，所以他们不会因为受到利诱而离开公司。

At Berkshire, managers can focus on running their businesses: They are not subjected to meetings at headquarters nor financing worries nor Wall Street harassment. They simply get a letter from me every two years (it’s reproduced on pages 104-105) and call me when they wish. And their wishes do differ: There are managers to whom I have not talked in the last year, while there is one with whom I talk almost daily. Our trust is in people rather than process. A “hire well, manage little” code suits both them and me.

在伯克希尔，经理人能够专注于经营各自的业务：他们无需参加总部召开的会议，也无需担忧融资问题，更不会受到华尔街的骚扰。他们只是每两年会收到本人的一封信， 如果他们愿意就会给我打电话。他们工作的方式各不相同： 在过去一年之中， 有些经理从未与我交谈，而有些经理几乎每天都要和我交谈。我们信任的是人， 而并非流程。 "雇佣优秀员工，少管理他们"的箴言不仅适用于这些经理人，而且也适用于我本人。

Berkshire’s CEOs come in many forms. Some have MBAs; others never finished college. Some use budgets and are by-the-book types; others operate by the seat of their pants. Our team resembles a baseball squad composed of all-stars having vastly different batting styles. Changes in our line-up are seldom required.

伯克希尔的 CEO 们各式各样。有些人拥有 MBA， 有些没上过大学。有些 CEO 按部就班进行预算； 有些则是按自己意愿行事。我们的团队犹如一支由击球风格迥异的全明星组成的棒球队，我们很少要求他们做出改变。

Our second advantage relates to the allocation of the money our businesses earn. After meeting the needs of those businesses, we have very substantial sums left over. Most companies limit themselves to reinvesting funds within the industry in which they have been operating. That often restricts them, however, to a “universe” for capital allocation that is both tiny and quite inferior to what is available in the wider world. Competition for the few opportunities that are available tends to become fierce. The seller has the upper hand, as a girl might if she were the only female at a party attended by many boys. That lopsided situation would be great for the girl, but terrible for the boys.

我们的第二个优势与我们分配利润的方式有关。在满足业务需要之后， 我们还有大量的剩余现金。 绝大多数公司资本再投资， 局限于自己一直经营的业务领域。 这往往将它们限制在一个很小的范围内，对于为数不多的机会的竞争趋于激烈。 卖方占据有力地位，如同在唯一一个女孩出现在一个男孩众多的舞会上一样。这种不均衡的的局面将对女孩有利，但对男孩来说就太糟糕了。

At Berkshire we face no institutional restraints when we deploy capital. Charlie and I are limited only by our ability to understand the likely future of a possible acquisition. If we clear that hurdle -- and frequently we can’t -- we are then able to compare any one opportunity against a host of others.

在伯克希尔，我们配置资本的时候不会受到制度上的约束。查理和我只是受制于个人的能力，无法理解潜在收购的可能未来。如果我们克服这项障碍(通常我们并不能)，我们就能够将一项机会与其他众多机会进行比较。

When I took control of Berkshire in 1965, I didn’t exploit this advantage. Berkshire was then only in textiles, where it had in the previous decade lost significant money. The dumbest thing I could have done was to pursue “opportunities” to improve and expand the existing textile operation -- so for years that’s exactly what I did. And then, in a final burst of brilliance, I went out and bought another textile company. Aaaaaaargh! Eventually I came to my senses, heading first into insurance and then into other industries.

当我于 1965 年接管伯克希尔的时候，并没有利用该项优势。当时，伯克希尔只从事纺织业务。在我接管之前的 10 年间， 公司亏损严重。我做过的最蠢的事情莫过于决定， 继续在现存的纺织业务里继续寻找机会并扩大经营， 所以在之后几年中我就一直致力于此，就在那时，在最后的灵光一闪中，我出去收购了另外一家纺织企业。啊啊啊(真是糟糕透了)！！最终，我醒悟过来， 首先跨入保险业， 之后又进入了其他行业。

There is even a supplement to this world-is-our-oyster advantage: In addition to evaluating the attractions of one business against a host of others, we also measure businesses against opportunities available in marketable securities, a comparison most managements don’t make. Often, businesses are priced ridiculously high against what can likely be earned from investments in stocks or bonds. At such moments, we buy securities and bide our time.

除了这种"世界尽在我手"的优势之外，还有一个补充：除了评估一个企业相对于其他企业的优点之外，我们还衡量这项业务相对于有价证券的机会。而这种衡量方式却被大多是管理层忽略了。在大多数情况下， 企业定价过高，而股票或债券投资可能赚取更高的收益。在这种情况下，我们买进证券， 等待时机。

Our flexibility in respect to capital allocation has accounted for much of our progress to date. We have been able to take money we earn from, say, See’s Candies or Business Wire (two of our best-run businesses, but also two offering limited reinvestment opportunities) and use it as part of the stake we needed to buy BNSF.

我们在资本配置上的灵活性，是我们迄今所取得的大多数成就的主要原因。 例如，我们的喜诗糖果或者美国商业资讯公司(Business Wire)是我们经营的最好的两项业务， 也是再投资机会非常有限的两项业务，我们从中两家公司获得收益，并将其收益投入到购买 BNSF 铁路公司中去。

Our final advantage is the hard-to-duplicate culture that permeates Berkshire. And in businesses, culture counts.

我们的最后一项优势是， 弥漫在伯克希尔内的难以复制的企业文化。在经营中，企业文化至关重要。

To start with, the directors who represent you think and act like owners. They receive token compensation: no options, no restricted stock and, for that matter, virtually no cash. We do not provide them directors and officers liability insurance, a given at almost every other large public company. If they mess up with your money, they will lose their money as well. Leaving my holdings aside, directors and their families own Berkshire shares worth more than $3 billion. Our directors, therefore, monitor Berkshire’s actions and results with keen interest and an owner’s eye. You and I are lucky to have them as stewards.

首先， 代表你们的董事们像股东一样思考和行动，他们只得到了象征性地补偿：没有期权、没有受限股票，而且因此，实质上也几乎没有现金。我们没有向董事和高管提供责任保险，而其他大型上市公司都提供责任保险。如果他们搞糟了你们的钱，他们也同样失去金钱。 除我个人股份以外，这些董事及其家庭所持有的伯克希尔股份价值超过 30 亿美元。因此，我们的董事，以极大的热情和股东视角监督伯克希尔的行动和结果。选择他们作为财产管理员，对你们和我来讲，何其幸运！

This same owner-orientation prevails among our managers. In many cases, these are people who have sought out Berkshire as an acquirer for a business that they and their families have long owned. They came to us with an owner’s mindset, and we provide an environment that encourages them to retain it. Having managers who love their businesses is no small advantage.

这种所有者导向的文化同样在我们子公司的管理层中盛行。 在很多中情况下，这些人们将伯克希尔视为一个收购他们及其家族所长期拥有的一项业务的收购方。他们带着所有者的心态加入我们，我们向他们提供一个能够保持这种所有者心态的环境。 拥有一批热爱自己业务的经理人，是我们一项很大的优势。

Cultures self-propagate. Winston Churchill once said, “You shape your houses and then they shape you.” That wisdom applies to businesses as well. Bureaucratic procedures beget more bureaucracy, and imperial corporate palaces induce imperious behavior. (As one wag put it, “You know you’re no longer CEO when you get in the back seat of your car and it doesn’t move.”) At Berkshire’s “World Headquarters” our annual rent is $270,212. Moreover, the home-office investment in furniture, art, Coke dispenser, lunch room, high-tech equipment -- you name it -- totals $301,363. As long as Charlie and I treat your money as if it were our own, Berkshire’s managers are likely to be careful with it as well.

文化是自我传播的。温斯顿·丘吉尔曾经说道， "你塑造了建筑，然后建筑塑造了你"(You shape your houses and then they shape you.)。这一智慧同样适用于企业。官僚主义的程序导致更多的官僚主义， 专制将诱发专横的行为。 正如一句俚语所言： 当你坐在汽车后座，而车一动不动时，你就知道自己已经不再是一名 CEO 了。在伯克希尔的"全球总部"，我们每年的租金仅为 270212 美元。 此外，办公室家具、艺术品、自动可乐售货机、午餐室、高科技设备等方面的投资为 301363 美元。只要查理和我视你们的钱为我们自己的钱，伯克希尔的经理人也将小心经营。

Our compensation programs, our annual meeting and even our annual reports are all designed with an eye to reinforcing the Berkshire culture, and making it one that will repel and expel managers of a different bent. This culture grows stronger every year, and it will remain intact long after Charlie and I have left the scene.

我们的薪酬方案、年度股东大会、甚至我们的年度报告的设计，都是为了增强伯克希尔的企业文化，使得这种文化能够排斥和驱逐带有不同倾向的经理人。 这种文化氛围逐年增强，即使在查理和我离职之后很久一段时间内，这种文化将完好无缺地保留下来。

We will need all of the strengths I’ve just described to do reasonably well. Our managers will deliver; you can count on that. But whether Charlie and I can hold up our end in capital allocation depends in part on the competitive environment for acquisitions. You will get our best efforts.

我们需要继续保持我以上描述的所有优势， 才能做得相当好。 我们的管理层会以身作则，这一点你们大可放心。但是，查理和我能否在资本分配方面坚持到底，部分取决于收购的竞争环境。我们将竭尽所能。

GEICO 盖可保险

Now let me tell you a story that will help you understand how the intrinsic value of a business can far exceed its book value. Relating this tale also gives me a chance to relive some great memories.

现在，让我来给你讲一个故事，该故事有助于你理解一项业务的内在价值可以远远超过其账面价值。 讲述这个故事可以让我重温一些美好的记忆。

Sixty years ago last month, GEICO entered my life, destined to shape it in a huge way. I was then a 20-year-old graduate student at Columbia, having elected to go there because my hero, Ben Graham, taught a once-a-week class at the school.

60 年前的一个月， GEICO 保险步入我的生活，从此改变了我的一生。当时，我是哥伦比亚大学一名 20 岁的研究生，之所以到那儿上学，因为我心目中的偶像本杰明.格雷厄姆，每周都会在学校教一次课。

One day at the library, I checked out Ben’s entry in Who’s Who in America and found he was chairman of Government Employees Insurance Co. (now called GEICO). I knew nothing of insurance and had never heard of the company. The librarian, however, steered me to a large compendium of insurers and, after reading the page on GEICO, I decided to visit the company. The following Saturday, I boarded an early train for Washington.

一天在图书馆，我在美国名人录中发现他是 GEICO 保险的主席。我对保险一无所知，并且从来没有听过该公司。然而，图书管理员指引我阅读一个大型的保险公司目录。在阅读到 GEICO 保险的时候，我决定拜访该公司。

Alas, when I arrived at the company’s headquarters, the building was closed. I then rather frantically started pounding on a door, until finally a janitor appeared. I asked him if there was anyone in the office I could talk to, and he steered me to the only person around, Lorimer Davidson.

在接下来的周六，我登上了前往华盛顿的早班车。在我抵达公司总部的时候， 大楼已经关门了。我当时不断敲门，直到最后一名看门人出来了。我问他公司是否还有人可以进行交谈，他就领我去找当时唯一一个还在办公室里的人，洛里默·戴维森(LorimerDavidson)。

That was my lucky moment. During the next four hours, “Davy” gave me an education about both insurance and GEICO. It was the beginning of a wonderful friendship. Soon thereafter, I graduated from Columbia and became a stock salesman in Omaha. GEICO, of course, was my prime recommendation, which got me off to a great start with dozens of customers. GEICO also jump-started my net worth because, soon after meeting Davy, I made the stock 75% of my $9,800 investment portfolio. (Even so, I felt over-diversified.)

我的幸运时刻到了。在接下来的四个小时里， "Davy"给我上了一节关于保险和 GEICO 的课程。我们之间伟大的友谊由此开始。不久以后，我从哥伦比亚大学毕业，成了奥马哈的一名股票销售员。当然， GEICO 保险就是我得首要推荐， 这让我与数十名客户建立了一个绝好的开端。就在与Davy 会面后不久，在我 9800 美元的投资组合中， GEICO 保险占了 75%，即便如此，我现在还是认为这个比例少了点。

Subsequently, Davy became CEO of GEICO, taking the company to undreamed-of heights before it got into trouble in the mid-1970s, a few years after his retirement. When that happened -- with the stock falling by more than 95% -- Berkshire bought about one-third of the company in the market, a position that over the years increased to 50% because of GEICO’s repurchases of its own shares. Berkshire’s cost for this half of the business was $46 million. (Despite the size of our position, we exercised no control over operations.)

后来， Davy 担任 GEICO 保险的 CEO，把公司发展到了梦想不到的高度。但是，就在 Davy 退休后的1970 年代， GEICO 保险陷入困境，股票价格下跌 95%。 伯克希尔在市场上购买了该公司大约 1/3 的股票。数年之后，由于 GEICO 保险的回购， 伯克希尔的持股比例增加到 50%， 伯克希尔的持有成本为 4600 万美元(尽管我们的持股比例比较高，但是没有行使控制权)。

We then purchased the remaining 50% of GEICO at the beginning of 1996, which spurred Davy, at 95, to make a video tape saying how happy he was that his beloved GEICO would permanently reside with Berkshire. (He also playfully concluded with, “Next time, Warren, please make an appointment.”)

在 1996 年初，我们又收购了 GEICO 保险剩余 50%的股票，这促使 Davy 在其 95 岁高龄之际，通过录像带向我表明他是多么高兴，他所热爱的 GEICO 保险将永久性地成为伯克希尔的一部分。 (他还十分风趣地总结道， "下次沃伦，请任命我哦。 ")

A lot has happened at GEICO during the last 60 years, but its core goal -- saving Americans substantial money on their purchase of auto insurance -- remains unchanged. (Try us at 1-800-847-7536 or http://www.GEICO.com.) In other words, get the policyholder’s business by deserving his business. Focusing on this objective, the company has grown to be America’s third-largest auto insurer, with a market share of 8.8%.

在过去的 60 年间， GEICO 保险发生了很多变故，但是，它的核心目标，大幅节省美国人的汽车保险购买成本，却始终未变(可以拨打电话 1-800-847-7596，或者登陆 www.GEICO.com 了解详情)。换而言之，通过获得保险客户的认可来获得业务。通过专注于该目标，公司发展成为美国第三大汽车保险商，市场占有率为 8.8%。

When Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, took over in 1993, that share was 2.0%, a level at which it had been stuck for more than a decade. GEICO became a different company under Tony, finding a path to consistent growth while simultaneously maintaining underwriting discipline and keeping its costs low.

当 GEICO 保险的 CEO 托尼·莱斯利(TonyNicely)上任的时候， GEICO 保险的市场占有率为 2.0%。 GEICO 保险的市场占有率曾经在 10 年中徘徊在该水平。在 Tony 的领导下， GEICO 保险成长为一家不同的公司，因为Tony 发现了一条持续增长的道路， 既能保持承保纪律， 又能保持低成本。

Let me quantify Tony’s achievement. When, in 1996, we bought the 50% of GEICO we didn’t already own, it cost us about $2.3 billion. That price implied a value of $4.6 billion for 100%. GEICO then had tangible net worth of $1.9 billion.

让我来量化一下 Tony 的成绩。当我们在 1996 年购买 GEICO 保险剩余的 50%的股权时，成本为 23 亿美元，对应的隐含价值为 46 亿美元， GEICO 保险当时有形资产账面价值为 19 亿美元。

The excess over tangible net worth of the implied value -- $2.7 billion -- was what we estimated GEICO’s “goodwill” to be worth at that time. That goodwill represented the economic value of the policyholders who were then doing business with GEICO. In 1995, those customers had paid the company $2.8 billion in premiums. Consequently, we were valuing GEICO’s customers at about 97% (2.7/2.8) of what they were annually paying the company. By industry standards, that was a very high price. But GEICO was no ordinary insurer: Because of the company’s low costs, its policyholders were consistently profitable and unusually loyal.

隐含价值比有形资产价值高27 亿美元，这 27 亿美元就是我们估算的 GEICO 保险的"商誉'在当时的价值。这种商誉代表当时与 GEICO 保险发生业务联系的保险客户的经济价值。在 1995 年，这些客户向 GEICO 保险支付了 28 亿美元的保费， 因此我们对 GEICO 客户的估值为他们每年支付给公司保费的 97%(27/28)。按照行业标准，这是一个非常高的价格。但是， GEICO 保险不是普通的保险公司。由于运营成本比较低， 承保一直是保持盈利的，并且客户忠诚度非常高。

Today, premium volume is $14.3 billion and growing. Yet we carry the goodwill of GEICO on our books at only $1.4 billion, an amount that will remain unchanged no matter how much the value of GEICO increases. (Under accounting rules, you write down the carrying value of goodwill if its economic value decreases, but leave it unchanged if economic value increases.) Using the 97%-of-premium-volume yardstick we applied to our 1996 purchase, the real value today of GEICO’s economic goodwill is about $14 billion. And this value is likely to be much higher ten and twenty years from now. GEICO -- off to a strong start in 2011 -- is the gift that keeps giving.

现在公司保费为 143 亿美元，并且持续上升。然而，在我们的账上， GEICO 商誉的账面价值仅为 14 亿美元。无论 GEICO 保险的价值增加多少，商誉的账面价值都保持不变(按照会计准则，如果商誉的经济价值降低，则需要减值，但如果经济价值增加， 则保持不变)。按照我们 1996 年购买 GEICO 保险的估值标准，现在 GEICO商誉的实际价值大约为 140 亿美元。 在 10-20 年之后，这个金额也更高。 在 2011 年 GEICO 保险迎来了一个强劲的开端，这是一份不断奉献给你们的礼物。

One not-so-small footnote: Under Tony, GEICO has developed one of the country’s largest personal-lines insurance agencies , which primarily sells homeowners policies to our GEICO auto insurance customers. In this business, we represent a number of insurers that are not affiliated with us. They take the risk; we simply sign up the customers. Last year we sold 769,898 new policies at this agency operation, up 34% from the year before. The obvious way this activity aids us is that it produces commission revenue; equally important is the fact that it further strengthens our relationship with our policyholders, helping us retain them.

一个不可忽略的备注：在 Tony 的领导下， GEICO 保险已经发展成为美国境内最大的个人保险 机构，主要向GEICO 保险汽车保险客户销售房主保单。在该项业务中，我们代表了众多与我们无关的保险公司。他们承担风险，我们只是负责销售。在 2010 年，我们出售了 769898 份新保单，比 2009 年增加了 34%。该项业务对我们最明显的帮助是能够带来佣金收入。同等重要的是，它进一步增强了我们的保险客户与我们的关系，有助于我们留住客户。

I owe an enormous debt to Tony and Davy (and, come to think of it, to that janitor as well).

我欠 Tony 和 Davy 很多(也同样欠那个看门人很多)。

Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of Berkshire. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

现在，让我们来检查一下伯克希尔的四大部门。每个部门的资产负债表和收入特征各有不同，将它们搅合在一块则无法分析。因此，我们将其作为四项独立业务展示， 这是查理和我对它们的看法。

We will look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.

首先来看保险业务，这是伯克希尔的核心业务以及多年来推动我们扩张的发动机。

Insurance 保险业务

Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums -- money we call “float” -- that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown: Just take a look at the following table:

财产意外险保险公司预先收取保费， 事后支付索赔。在极端情况下，例如对于工人事故赔偿问题所引发的索赔，索赔支付可能会持续数十年。这种"先收钱后付款"的模式使我们持有大量的现金，我们称其为"浮存金"，这些"浮存金"最终将流向投保人。同时，我们可以用"浮存金"为伯克希尔投资并获利。尽管个人保单和索赔来去不停，但我们持有的浮存金相比保单数量却特别稳定。因此，随着公司业务的增长，浮存金也会增长。我们是如何增长的，请看下表：

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income that our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money -- and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company, has incurred an underwriting loss in seven of the last ten years. During that period, its aggregate underwriting loss was more than $20 billion.

如果我们收到的的保费超过运营费用和最终赔付损失的总和，则记为承保利润， 这将加计入到保险浮存金产生的投资收益之中。如果承保产生了利润，我们就能享受到免费使用这些资金， 更棒的是，还因为持有这种免费资金而获得回报。哎， 所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人满意的结果， 这导致了激烈的竞争。在绝大多数年份，竞争是如此激烈，以至于财产意外险行业整体遭遇严重的承保亏损。实际上这一损失是财产意外险行业持有保险浮存金所付出的代价。例如，州立农业保险到目前为止是美国最大的保险公司，尽管其经营管理良好，但在过去10 年之中，有 7 年都发生了承保损失。在此期间，总承保损失超过 200 亿美元。

At Berkshire, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eight consecutive years, our total underwriting gain for the period having been $17 billion. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most -- though certainly not all -- future years. If we accomplish that, our float will be better than cost-free. We will benefit just as we would if some party deposited $66 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.

伯克希尔我们连续八年获得承保盈利，在此期间的盈利总计达到 170 亿美元。我相信我们在将来的绝大多数年份(尽管不是全部)都将继续保持盈利。如果我们达到了这个目标，我们持有的浮存金将比零成本更棒。就像有人向我们存入 660 亿美元，每年还因为这些钱而向我们支付费用， 然后允许我们拿去投资获利，我们必将受益。

Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, industry premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some unusual businesses. We’ve already told you about GEICO, but we have two other very large operations, and a bevy of smaller ones as well, each a star in its own way.

我要再次强调一下， "无成本"的浮存金并不是整个财产意外险行业的一个预期结果。在大多数年份，行业的保险费不足以支付理赔和运营费用。因此，几十年来，保险业有形资本的回报率远远低于美国全行业实现的平均收益率， 这种令人失望的表现肯定会持续下去。 伯克希尔之所以拥有雄厚的经济效益，是因为我们有一些卓越的经理人，他们经营着一些非同寻常的业务。除了 GEICO 保险外，我们还拥有另外两家大型保险公司和数家小公司。每个公司都因为自己的特色而熠熠生辉。

First off is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative than most large insurers in that respect. In the past year, Ajit has significantly increased his life reinsurance operation, developing annual premium volume of about $2 billion that will repeat for decades.

首先是伯克希尔再保险集团，由阿吉特·贾恩负责。阿吉特·贾恩(Ajit Jain)敢于承保他人不愿意，或者其他资本不愿意接手的风险，其经营融合了能力、速度和果断，更重要的是，在保险业，他拥有独具一格的思维方式。他从未让伯克希尔遭受与自身实力不成比例的风险。实际上，我们在这一点上比业内的其他大型保险公司更为保守。在 2010 年，阿吉特·贾恩大幅提高了人寿再保险业务，保险费高达 20 亿美元，这将在今后持续数十年(来自瑞士再保险)。

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $30 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By his accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Even kryptonite bounces off Ajit.

自 1985 年以来，阿吉特·创建了一家拥有 300 亿美元浮存金和巨额承保利润的保险公司， 这一成就 是其他任何保险公司的 CEO 都无法企及的壮举。阿吉特所取得的成就为伯克希尔增添了数十亿美元的资产。 即使氪石都无法击败他。 (氪石是科幻故事里无敌的氪星人终极弱点)

We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们还拥有通用再保险公司，由泰德·蒙特罗斯(TadMontross)负责管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation requires four disciplines: (1) An understanding of all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) A conservative evaluation of the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) The setting of a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) The willingness to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

实际上，保险业务的健康运营需要遵循四条准则： 1、 了解可能导致承保损失的所有风险； 2、 保守地估计造成实际损失的任何风险的可能性以及一旦发生损失情况下的可能成本； 3、 一般来讲，在扣除预期索赔损失和运营费用之后， 设定的保费能够获得平均的承保收益； 4、 如果不能获得合理的保费就放弃这项业务。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. The urgings of Wall Street, pressures from the agency force and brokers, or simply a refusal by a testosterone-driven CEO to accept shrinking volumes has led too many insurers to write business at inadequate prices. “The other guy is doing it so we must as well” spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.

许多保险公司通过了前三条准则的考验，却在第四条碰了壁。华尔街的急功近利、机构和经纪人带来的压力，或者是雄性激素驱动的 CEO 不肯接受业务下滑，导致许多保险公司以低价承保。 "别人在做，我们也必须要做"，这种想法让许多企业身陷困境， 而保险行业尤其如此。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be.

Tad 一贯恪守这四条准则，这在他的业绩中得到了体现。 通用再保险公司在他的领导下拥有巨额可以免费使用的保险浮存金，并获得承保利润。我们预计该公司的浮存金规模能够持续下去。

Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

最后，我们拥有许多小型保险公司，其中，它们中的绝大多数都有专属经营领域。总体而言，这些保险公司一直以来都是盈利的，向我们提供了大量的浮存金(见下表)。我和查理非常珍视这些企业和他们的经理人。

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

下表为我们财产意外险业务所有四个部门的业绩记录：

Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world.

在大型的保险公司中，我认为伯克希尔是世界上最好的保险公司。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造业、服务业和零售业

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔在该部分的业务涵盖广泛， 让我看一看整个部门的资产负债表和利润表摘要：

Balance Sheet 12/31/10 (in $ millions)

Earnings Statement (in $ millions)

* Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.

This group of companies sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. Unfortunately, a few have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I have made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business I was purchasing or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor.

这群企业销售的产品范围很广，从棒棒糖到喷气飞机。有些企业的经济效益特别好。用非杠杆净有形资产收益率来衡量，其税后收益率最低为 25%， 高的甚至超过 100%。其他企业的收益率在 12-20%之间。不幸的是，少数企业的收益率特别低，这是我在资本配置的工作中所犯下的严重错误的结果。 之所以发生这些错误，是因为我错误判断了我所收购的企业的竞争力，或者它在该行业的未来经济效益。我试图本着十年二十年的长期持有来进行收购，但有时候也难免老眼昏花。

Most of the companies in this section improved their earnings last year and four set records. Let’s look first at the record-breakers.

该组中的绝多大数企业在 2010 年收益有所提高， 让我们先看看收益创造了新的记录的四家企业。

• TTI, our electronic components distributor, had sales 21% above its previous high (recorded in 2008) and pre-tax earnings that topped its earlier record by 58%. Its sales gains spanned three continents, with North America at 16%, Europe at 26%, and A